SECRET

1209

# TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

| TO | FROM |
|---|---|
| C/WHD | COS, SANTIAGO |

| ITEM NO. | DESCRIPTION | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 5 memos: [redacted] "The Alessandri Campaign" [redacted] Comments on the Role of Non-Aligned Nations" "Stages of Allende's Campaign" 1 cy [redacted] PCCH pursuing electoral victory - 1 cy [redacted] | PLS PASS [redacted] THEIR COPIES FOR YOUR USE |

28 MAY 1970 [redacted]

[redacted]

Declassified and
Approved for Release
July 2000

FORM 1226

SECRET

(13-4

CONFIDENTIAL

Sent: WH [redacted]

20 May 1970

TO : The Ambassador and
The Deputy Chief of Mission

[redacted]

INFO: Mr. [redacted]

We are surprised to hear doubts expressed as to whether the PCCh is indeed seriously pursuing an electoral victory, or whether they might not prefer the relative security as a "Loyal" opposition party basking in Moscow's favor. We are quite convinced that the PCCh is going all out in achieving an Allende victory. The party is, after all, fighting for its political life. The September election may well be its last chance to prove that the "via electoral" offers a satisfactory release for revolutionary zeal and energy.

Many leaders of the PCCh are aware that, should Allende make a poor showing at the polls, the PCCh will lose much of its influence over the leftist part of the spectrum. The Socialist Party and the fringe MIR will undoubtedly gain additional adherents, converted to the use of violent revolutionary action. Particularly vulnerable to such hard line erosion would, however, be the PCCh's own communist youth.

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1--WHD
1--[redacted]
1--Memo
(Source: [redacted])

22 May 1970

Memorandum to: The Ambassador

Info [redacted]

Subject : Stages of Allende's Campaign

[redacted]

1. [redacted] believes that campaign activities between now and September will improve Allende's situation in the province of Santiago and also in the rest of the country. Two basic factors are contributive:

A. The deterioration of Alessandri's image as a result of land owner violence and the Carmine incident and;

B. The rise in the cost of living which around the month of August could conceivably reach a level of 40%.

2. The above two factors will be working against the Christian Democrats. At the same time, however, it will be necessary to take into account that anything which works to the detriment of the Christian Democrats at the same time redounds to the benefit of Alessandri more than of Allende.

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[redacted]

3. [redacted] defined as one of Allende's major problems the failure of the socialist youth to participate in campaign activities. As a result of this, the communist youth and some radicals, for all practical purposes, have filled the void.

4. [redacted] the MIR has with its acts of violence, and inasmuch as the public identifies Allende with the MIR, caused havoc. The last issue of Punta Final (containing MIR's policy declaration) was partly propaganda and partly injurious. Not everybody will read with attention what MIR has to say in its political declaration. The MIRistas have tried to respect the friendship which exists between Allende and the journalists who collaborate with the MIR (Augusto Olivares, Jaime Valvovic, Carlos Josquera and Manuel Cabieses. However, their posture is a different one. They do not believe in the "Via Electoral" and favor a revolution of a different type.

5. [redacted] described Allende's situation in the provinces of Magallanes, Aisen, Llanquihue, O'Higgins, Coquimbo, Antofagasta and Tarapaca as good, and in the remaining provinces conditions are bad particularly in Osorno, Valdivia, Cautin, Maule, Bio Bio and Malleco.

6. [redacted] described the situation in Concepcion and Arauco as so-so and blamed this on the activities of the MIR and the brothers Enriquez. However, [redacted] does not believe that the withdrawal of Renato Lacmermann from the Partido Radical has had any great repercussions. Lacmermann owed his seat in Congress not to radical votes, which in Arauco do not exist, but to the votes of the old liberals.

7. [redacted] admitted [redacted] preoccupation over the situation in Concepcion. Humberto Aguirre has been able to maintain his hold on his radical following but he lacks the fangs needed for electoral work.

8. As regards the situation in Talca, [redacted] depends on the support supplied by Tarud. In Curico the left is badly divided as a result of Naranjo's defection to the USP which has generated tremendous confusion. He now maintains a passive attitude. If he has a shred of loyalty left for Allende, he will do something. [redacted] has hopes that Naranjo will in the end play an active role. [redacted] referred to the USP as "una

gente my corrida," (which can be translated as either very experienced or very abashed). In some instances the USP is acting from personal hatreds, in others because of their personal attachment to Raul Ampuero, this being the case of Naranjo and Silva Ulloa.

9. In commenting on the situation in Santiago, [redacted] claimed that Allende's campaign management is getting organized beyond expectation. However, [redacted] conceded that Alessandri is strong, even in some of the most miserable slums, and that Allende's people have been unable to overcome "la resistencia" of Alessandrists elements. [redacted] expressed the belief that very few people will be undergoing a change of heart.

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1--POL
1--WHD
1--MEMO
1--[redacted]

19 May 1970

Memorandum to: The Ambassador & Deputy Chief of Mission

Subject : The Alessandri Campaign

[redacted]

2. Since early May Angel Moschi has been functioning as secretary general and coordinator for Ernesto P i n t o in JAR's campaign. Moschi gives guidance and coordinates campaign matters after ostensible consultation with Pinto. He is very capable and will be a good man in the campaign.

3. Alessandri seems content with the way his campaign has been going. He agrees with the younger generation and non-politicians that his campaign need not be a traditional one; that is, that he does not need a grass-roots mechanism because he is already well-known. He thinks that it will be enough to present his new image and explain his position.

4. The old-timers in Alessandri's campaign think otherwise. They say that although Alessandri is well-known and does a good job of selling himself while in a place, he is suffering from the lack of follow up: Allende and Tomic come in with new ideas which go over well. The old-timers are convinced that without money and hard work, JAR will lose many back country areas by default.

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[redacted]

5. [redacted] In this area, one has to bring in the outlying voters by boat etc. [redacted] is afraid that Alessandri will lose the extreme south to Allende unless he pursues similar tactics. [redacted] comment. The Alessandri campaign lacks funds for this kind of campaigning. When the pro-Alessandri forces in Valparaiso recently sent in a budget proposal for E 245,000 monthly, they were sent a one-time assistance of E 45,000.)

6. Renato L a e r m a n n is in touch with leading PDR members and is following others advice to remain outside that party, where he can be more useful as an independent. Laermann has been taken to see JAR, who received him well. Laermann has promised to work for Alessandri as hard as he can in his area and has guaranteed that it will give Alessandri a majority.

cc: [redacted]



[redacted]

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DENIED IN TOTO